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Is the U.S. Supreme Court Becoming Hostile to the Administrative State?
By Jeffrey S. Lubbers*
The U.S. Constitution’s Separation-of-Powers doctrine is based on that document’s
vesting of legislative, executive and judicial powers solely in those three respective branches.
Although Article I, Section 8’s list of subjects of legislative power implies the need for executive
agencies to collect taxes and customs duties, regulate commerce, coin money, establish post
offices, provide for patents and copyrights, regulate government lands, and maintain armies, such
agencies are barely alluded to, with only three undefined references to “departments,” one in the
Necessary-and-Proper Clause of that Section,1 and two in Article II’s only two clauses devoted
to the organization of the executive branch—the Appointments Clause2 and the Report Clause.3
However, the first Congress created several departments4 and delegated authority to the
President to pay pensions “to the invalids who were wounded and disabled during the late war . .
. under such regulations as the President of the United States may direct.”5 Still though, the
Executive Branch was quite small before the Civil War,6 and even at the end of the Nineteenth
*
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1

“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in and Department or Officer
thereof.”
2

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

3

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Note that the term “principal officers of the executive departments” is also
mentioned in the XXV Amendment, § 4.
4

In 1800, there were only three Departments (State, War, and Treasury). The offices of Attorney General and
Postmaster General were also created, but their departments were created much later. Wikipedia—Executive
Departments.

5
6

First Congress: Act of September 29, 1789.

Before the Civil War, in addition to the offices mentioned in note 4, the Department of the Interior had been
created in 1849 absorbing the General Land Office, which existed as a free-standing agency from 1812-1849. Other
agencies included the Board of Supervising Inspectors (created in 1852 to regulate steamboat safety); the U.S. Mint,

Century only comprised eight departments7 and several free-standing agencies, notably the Civil
Service Commission created by the Pendleton Act of 1883,8 the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), created by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887—the first independent
regulatory agency whose members could only be removed by the President for cause.9
But with the advent of the Twentieth Century, the modern “Administrative State” began
to emerge.10 The 1906 Hepburn Act gave the ICC rate-making authority, “making it a very
powerful agency. Until this time, the agency, with little discretionary power, had been rather
weak and ineffectual, but the Progressives saw the value in an entity removed from politics and
promoted the independent form.”11 The Department of Commerce and Labor was established in
1903 and split into separate Departments in 1913. In that latter year, President Wilson signed the
Federal Reserve Act, which required all national banks to join the Federal Reserve System,
which in turn was overseen by a Board of Governors.12 In 1916, a piece of social legislation was

which operated as a free-standing agency reporting to the President from 1799 to 1873 when it became part of the
Department
of
the
Treasury,
see
“timeline
of
the
U.S.
Mint,
http://www.usmint.gov/education/historianscorner/?action=timeline, the Smithsonian Institution established in 1846;
and several Congressional agencies—the Library of Congress (established in 1800), the Botanic Gardens
(established in 1820) and the Government Printing Office (established in 1860). For extensive coverage of
steamboat regulation see JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION—THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ch. 7, 187-203 (2012).
7

The Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Justice, Navy, Post Office, State, Treasury and War. There was also a
non-cabinet Department of Labor, created in 1888. As mentioned, later in the text, it was not given independent
cabinet status until 1913. See Mashaw, supra note 6, at 240 and n.76.

8

See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEAL—A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL
SERVICE 206-08 (2003), available at http://archive.opm.gov/BiographyofAnIdeal/PDF/BiographyOfAnIdeal.pdf.
9

Originally the Commission was placed in the Department of the Interior, but two years later “the Secretary’s
authority over the commission was eliminated by statute and the commission became functionally independent of
the executive branch.” Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1129 (2000).
10

See DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 19001940 (2014).

11

Id. at 1130.

12

At first, the Secretary of the Treasury chaired the Board, but this was changed in 1935. See the Board of
Governors’ home page at http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/boardmembership.htm. For more
on the experimentation in the Nineteenth Century with national banks, see Mashaw, supra note 6, at ch. 9, 156-174.
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enacted creating the U.S. Employees’ Compensation Commission (USEC) to administer
workers’ compensation benefits for civil employees of the United States suffering personal
injuries while in the performance of official duties.13 Congress created other new free-standing
regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission in 191414 and the Federal Radio
Commission in 1927,15 with very broad delegations. To address the Great Depression many new
financial regulatory agencies were created,16 along with the Federal Power Commission in
1930,17 the powerful but short-lived National Recovery Administration (NRA) in 1933, the
National Labor Relations Board in 1935,18 and the United States Maritime Commission in
1936.19 The Bureau of the Budget (precursor to the Office of Management and Budget) was
created in 1921 to help coordinate the funding of the expanded Executive Branch.20

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency had been created within the Department of the Treasury in 1863, see
id. at 242.
13

See description in the U.S. Government Organization Manual (1945), available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ATO/USGM/USECC.html. The USEC’s jurisdiction was broadened in 1927 to
include administration of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, which provided workers’
compensation benefits for employees in private enterprise while engaged in maritime employment on navigable
waters of the United States.

14

See the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717. Section 5 contained the broad delegation that the FTC was
charged with enforcing: “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” (now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012)). For a
legislative history of the Act, see Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 27 B.C. L. REV. 227 (1980).
15

See the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69–632, 44 Stat. 1162, which created a Federal Radio Commission in
section 3 and propounded the “public interest, convenience or necessity” standard for regulation in section 4. In
1934, the Act was superseded by the Communications Act, which replaced the Federal Radio Commission with the
Federal Communications Commission. Pub. L. No. 416, June 19, 1934, 73d Cong.

16

These include the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1932); Farm Credit Administration and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (1933); Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Federal Credit Union Board (1934).

17

The Commission was actually created in 1920 to coordinate federal hydroelectric projects, but it was under the
joint administration of the Secretary of War, Interior, and Agriculture. The version created in 1930 was a classic
independent regulatory commission. In 1977 the FPC became the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See
History of FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/students/ferc/history.asp.

18

National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.

19

According to the Federal Maritime Commission’s [FMC’s] website:

3

At first, Congress and the Supreme Court showed skepticism about this growth. In 1894
the Supreme Court declared the income tax unconstitutional,21 a decision that was ultimately
addressed in 1913 by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. The Court also struck down
two delegations to the NRA in 1935,22 causing it to stop operating, and Congress passed, and
came close to overriding President Franklin Roosevelt’s veto of, the Walter-Logan bill,23 which
would have subjected administrative agencies to formal hearings in their rulemakings and in
response to petitions to revise rules, required them to use three-person panels in adjudications,
and made their actions subject to extensive judicial review.24
During World War II, the military agencies were expanded, and right afterwards
Congress enacted the APA, which provided for procedural limits on agency action, but also
implicitly recognized agency rulemaking and adjudicative power.25

In the last half of the

Twentieth Century, Congress created seven of the current fifteen departments and many new

In 1920, Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act, which charged the United States Shipping
Board with monitoring and responding to foreign laws, regulations, or practices that create
conditions unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade.
In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an executive order that transferred the United
States Shipping Board’s functions to the U.S. Shipping Board Bureau in the Department of
Commerce. In 1936, Congress separated the Board from the Commerce Department, creating the
United States Maritime Commission. . . . In 1950, the regulatory programs of the United States
Maritime Commission were transferred to the Federal Maritime Board at the Department of
Commerce, where they resided until the FMC’s creation in 1961.
Http://www.fmc.gov/about/history.aspx.
20

Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67–13, 42 Stat. 20 (1921).

21

Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff’d on rehrg., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).

22

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935), Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 446
(1935).

23

See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal
Politics, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 1557, 1593–1632 (1996) (describing the legislative action on the Walter-Logan bill).
The vote to override the veto in the House was 153 to 127, or 34 votes short. Id. at 1630.

24

See PETER WOLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE INFORMAL PROCESS, 18-19 (1963) (describing the bill as an
“extreme attempt on the part of the legal profession to judicialize administrative procedure”). Id. at 19.

25

See generally Shepherd, supra note 23.
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regulatory agencies, some of which, like the Departments of Transportation and Homeland
Security and the Environmental Protection Agency, have broad regulatory power.
Several key Supreme Court decisions have stimulated the growth of agency power. An
early one was the 1932 decision of Crowell v. Benson,26 which upheld Congress’s ability to
delegate adjudicative power to the USEC.27 That was followed closely by Humphrey’s Executor
v. United States 1935,28 which, in effect, recognized Congress’s power to create independent
agencies.

After the passage of the APA, the Court enhanced the authority of agency

administrative law judges (ALJs) (then called “hearing examiners”) in Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB29 and Butz v. Economou.30
A series of cases sharply limited the non-delegation doctrine, ruling that delegations were
proper as long as the legislation passed by Congress contained an “intelligible principle” to be
followed by the agency in its regulations.31 Occasional protests to this low bar were heard,32 but

26

285 U.S. 22 (1932).

27

In so doing, the Court distinguished cases involving matters of “public rights” in which the government and
private persons were opposing parties, and matters of “private rights” where two private parties were opposed. The
Court reasoned that because Congress could assign public rights disputes to itself or to executive officers, it could
also assign them to administrative tribunals like the USEC. However, the USEC essentially was a referee between a
private employer and employee in the Longshoreman and Harbor Workers context so that distinction did not apply.
Nevertheless the Court upheld the delegation because it found that Article III courts had the power to independently
review all issues of law and “questions of constitutional and jurisdictional fact.” See MICHAEL ASIMOW AND
RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 460-61 (4th ed. 2014).
28

295 U.S. 602 (1935).

29

340 U.S. 474 (1951) (requiring reviewing courts to consider the initial decisions of hearing examiners as part of
the record in reviewing agency final orders).

30

438 U.S. 478, 513 (1977) (“There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal hearing examiner or
administrative law judge . . . is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge.”).

31

This test actually originated in the 1928 case of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928) (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power.”) Other than the two decisions involving the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1935, supra note 22, the
Court has never struck down an Act of Congress on non-delegation grounds.

32

See Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J. concurring
in the judgment, but finding a violation of the non-delegation doctrine).
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Justice Scalia seemed to have resignedly accepted it in the 2001 case of American Trucking
Associations when the Court rebuffed an attempt by the D.C. Circuit to revive the doctrine.33
These were important developments, but it is in the realm of scope of judicial review
where the Supreme Court has really “fertilized” the growth of agency power. The pre-APA case
of Skidmore v. Swift34 held, somewhat circularly, that agency interpretations of their own statutes
should be accepted by the courts where they were persuasive, depending on a series of factors.
But in another case decided just before enactment of the APA, Bowles v. Seminole Rock and
Sand,35 the Court said that courts normally should defer to agency interpretations of their own
regulations—a principle that was followed and reinforced in Auer v. Robbins36 in 1997. In
between those two cases, the Court propounded the famous Chevron doctrine, holding that courts
must accept reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous provisions of their own statutes.37
Procedural review of agency actions was also limited by the Court’s decision in Vermont
Yankee,38 which held that courts should not require procedures beyond those in the APA in
review of agency rulemaking.

In that case Justice Rehnquist criticized the D.C. Circuit’s

“Monday morning quarterbacking” of agency procedural choices.39

The Vermont Yankee

33

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (“In short, we have ‘almost never felt qualified to
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or
applying the law.’”) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).

34

323 U.S. 134 (1944). See also Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944), decided
the same year, where the Court approved an NLRB interpretation of the word “employee” saying, “where the
question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering
the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court’s function is limited.”

35

325 U.S. 410 (1945).

36

519 U.S. 452 (1997).

37

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

38

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).

39

Id. at 547 (“This sort of Monday morning quarterbacking not only encourages but almost compels the agency to
conduct all rulemaking proceedings with the full panoply of procedural devices normally associated only with
adjudicatory hearings.”).
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doctrine was quickly extended to review of agency formal adjudications,40 and then, oddly, even
to informal adjudications.41
In another set of cases, dealing with access to judicial review, the Supreme Court, led by
its conservative majority, has erected a higher bar for litigants against the government. Although
in the Abbott Labs case, the Court in 1966 recognized a presumption of reviewability in the
APA,42 and also allowed pre-enforcement review of rules,43 later decisions on standing to sue,44
ripeness,45 finality,46 and the Court’s disinclination to imply private rights of action,47 all have
made it more difficult for challengers of agency action. To be sure, these cases may have been
motivated by a different set of conservative principles—that disfavor federal court litigation—
but they have provided effective defenses for the government in defending suits against
government agencies.
All of these developments can be seen as broadly pro-agency, but there are a few parts of
the administrative law doctrine that are more ambivalent or even cut the other way. Cases
applying the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious test48 have swung back and forth from the “hard

40

Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 104 (1981).

41

LTV Corp. v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653–55 (1990). I say “oddly” because the APA provides
little by way of procedure for informal adjudications.

42

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1966) (“only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a
contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review”) (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367,
379–380 (1962)).

43

Id. at 148–56.

44

See e.g., Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

45

See e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 200 (1994).

46

See e.g. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).

47

See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). See also Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 1378 (2015) (Supremacy Clause does not confer a private right of action to sue to enjoin unconstitutional
actions by state officials carrying out federal statute).

48

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A).
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look” of State Farm49 to the “soft look” of Baltimore Gas and Electric,50 (decided just months
apart), with a later decision, written by Justice Scalia, giving agencies the added flexibility of
allowing them to change policies without being subject to a stricter form of the test.51
Overall, the great majority of the Supreme Court’s post World War II administrative law
cases, until the last few years, have favored executive agency power and discretion. But this
long-standing trend appears to be experiencing an undertow, at least judging by some recent
opinions signed at various times by five Justices of the current Court.
Several of the above “pillars” of the Administrative State—Auer, Chevron, and the weak
non-delegation doctrine—have been criticized in the last five years by several members of the
Court.

Even Humphrey’s Executor has been whittled slightly by the Public Company

Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) case, where the Court balked at allowing “double forcause” protection for members of the PCAOB.52 And the last major pillar, Vermont Yankee,
while still standing and invoked in a conclusive way in this Term’s decision in Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers,53 has itself been diluted by the Court’s acceptance of several procedural
norms in rulemaking not found in the APA that had already been imposed by the D.C. Circuit
before Vermont Yankee was decided.54
49

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).

50

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).

51

See FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009) (“We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure
Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review. The Act
mentions no such heightened standard.”).

52

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498 (2010) (holding that the PCAOB
members’ for-cause protection, when coupled with the same protection given to its overseeing agency, the SEC,
“subverts the President's ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed”).

53

135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (holding that the D.C. Circuit’s insistence that an agency must go through notice and
comment when it changes a prior interpretation of a regulation violated Vermont Yankee).

54

See Peter Strauss, Recent Developments in Administrative Law—The Tremors of March 9, 2015, (forthcoming in
this volume) __ (referring to State Farm’s and Perez’s acceptance of the requirement that agencies respond to
significant public comments in the final rule preamble despite the APA’s simple prescription of a “concise”
statement of basis and purpose for final rules).

8

The Auer deference doctrine was the first to come under frontal attack—ironically by the
author of the unanimous opinion in Auer, Justice Scalia. The idea of an agency getting deference
when it interpreted its own rules had been criticized by some scholars, including in a strong and
apparently influential article by one of Justice Scalia’s former law clerks, John Manning.55 He
and other critics pointed out that under two post-Chevron cases, Christensen56 and Mead,57
agencies normally would only be entitled to Skidmore deference for interpretations of statutes
propounded in rules that did not go through notice and comment such as policy statements or
interpretive rules, but that if an agency issued a rule that simply parroted the statute and then
issued an interpretation of that rule, they could achieve Auer deference. The Supreme Court
responded by disallowing this in Gonzales v. Oregon.58 Nevertheless, in 2011, in Talk America
v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,59 in a case in which Justice Thomas applied the Auer doctrine to
an FCC interpretation of its own regulation, Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but said:
It is comforting to know that I would reach the Court’s result even without Auer.
For while I have in the past uncritically accepted that rule, I have become
increasingly doubtful of its validity. On the surface, it seems to be a natural
55

John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996). This article, written before Auer was decided, focused its criticism on Seminole Rock.
It has been prominently cited in four Supreme Court cases in the last five years: Justice Scalia in his opinion in Talk
America v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J. concurring); Justice Alito in his
majority opinion in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012); Justice Scalia again in
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S. Ct. 1336, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part); and Justice Alito again in Perez v. Mortgage Banker, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For another influential criticism, also written before Auer, see
Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1,
11–12 (1996).
56

Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000).

57

United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218 (2000).

58

546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“Simply put, the existence of a parroting regulation does not change the fact that the
question here is not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the statute. An agency does not acquire
special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a
regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”). See also Paralyzed Veterans of America v.
D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. (1997) (“It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate mush and
then give it concrete form only through subsequent less formal ‘interpretations.’”).

59

131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011).
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corollary—indeed, an a fortiori application—of [Chevron]. But it is not. When . .
. an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation
of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule’s meaning. . . . It seems
contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the person
who promulgates a law to interpret it as well [citing Montesquieu].
Deferring . . . to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency
to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it
pleases. This frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and
promotes arbitrary government.60
We have not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case. When we are, I
will be receptive to doing so.
The next year, in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,61 the Court’s conservative
majority refused to apply Auer where it found that to do so would result in “unfair surprise.”
That same term it went back to applying Auer in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense
Center,62 where it deferred to an EPA interpretation of a water pollution regulation, but Justice
Scalia dissented on the merits and firmly rejected Auer: “Enough is enough. . . . Auer is not a
logical corollary to Chevron but a dangerous permission slip for the arrogation of power.”63 This
time his dissent attracted the interest of Chief Justice Roberts (with Justice Alito) who wrote that
Justice Scalia’s opinion “raises serious questions. . . . The issue is a basic one going to the heart
of administrative law. . . . I would await a case in which the issue is properly raised and
argued.”64
Meanwhile there was similar increasing scrutiny on the breadth of the Chevron doctrine.
In City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC,65 the Court granted certiorari to settle a long unanswered

60

Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J. concurring).

61

132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012).

62

133 S. Ct. 1336 (2013).

63

Id. at 1339, 1341 (Scalia, J. dissenting).

64

Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J. concurring).

65

133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
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question—whether Chevron applied to an agency statutory interpretation that enlarged its
jurisdiction. To do this the Court chose a rather garden variety dispute. The Communications
Act requires state or local governments to act on siting applications for wireless facilities “within
a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed.”66 In another part of the Act, the FCC
is given the authority to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public
interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.”67 Relying on this delegation, the FCC issued
a declaratory ruling that state and local governments normally have 90 days to process an
application to place a new antenna on an existing tower and 150 days to process all other
applications. The city thought those deadlines were too short, so it challenged the FCC’s
authority to issue them, citing a “savings clause” in the Act that said that nothing in the Act,
except the subsection that included the reasonable time provision, “shall limit or affect the
authority of a State or local government” over siting decisions.68
The Fifth Circuit held that the Chevron framework applied to the threshold question
whether the FCC possessed statutory authority to adopt timeframes. It found the interplay of the
savings clause and the reasonable time provision to be ambiguous, and then upheld as
permissible under Chevron step two the FCC’s interpretation of its statutory authority to
establish deadlines.69 The appeals court then upheld the actual 90– and 150–day deadlines as
reasonable.70

66

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).

67

47 U.S. C § 201(b).

68

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7(A).

69

City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 668 F.3d. 229, 249–254. (2012).

70

Id. at 254–261.
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At the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, whose preference for decisional bright-line rules
over what he called “the ol’ totality of the circumstances test”71 had led him to strongly defend
Chevron in previous cases as superseding the Skidmore test,72 carried the banner for Chevron
once again. He joined Justice Thomas and the liberals (save for Justice Breyer) in giving the
FCC’s interpretation of the Communications Act deference. Justice Breyer, who does prefer a
more multi-variable test,73 also ruled for the FCC in a separate concurrence.
Justice Scalia’s argument was partly a pragmatic one: “[J]udges should not waste their
time in the mental acrobatics needed to decide whether an agency’s interpretation of a statutory
provision is ‘jurisdictional’ or ‘nonjurisdictional.’”74 But he also was concerned that although
that
false dichotomy . . . may be no more than a bogeyman, [ ] it is dangerous all the
same. Like the Hound of the Baskervilles, it is conjured by those with greater
quarry in sight: Make no mistake—the ultimate target here is Chevron itself.
Savvy challengers of agency action would play the “jurisdictional” card in every
case.75
But what was really notable about this case was the Chief Justice’s dissent. Joined by
Justices Kennedy and Alito, he wrote that in this circumstance the lower court should not have
applied Chevron, but “should have determined on its own whether Congress delegated

71

See U.S. v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218, 241, where Justice Scalia, in dissent, complained that “The Court has
largely replaced Chevron, in other words, with that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and
most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect): th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”).

72

See his separate opinion in Christensen v. Harris County., 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000). (Scalia J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (labeling Skidmore deference “an anachronism” and Chevron a “watershed
decision”).

73

See his concurrence in City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct at 1875, where he quotes his own opinion in Barnhart v.
Wilson, as to the need to assess “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the
importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time.” (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S.
212, 222 (2002)).
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133 S. Ct. at 1870.
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Id. at 1872–73
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interpretive authority over § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) to the FCC before affording Chevron deference.”76
In other words, reviewing courts would have to find not simply a delegation to make
interpretations of the overall program statute, but instead a specific delegation to interpret the
particular ambiguous provision at issue. This would sharply limit the situations where Chevron
would apply.77
Why did the Chief Justice want to do this? The rest of his opinion makes clear that he
thinks the Administrative State has too much power. He quotes his own opinion in the PCAOB
case: “The administrative state ‘wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily
life.’”78 He states: “The Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s ‘vast and varied federal
bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our economic, social, and
political activities. ‘[T]he administrative state with its reams of regulations would leave them
rubbing their eyes.’”79 He goes on, “It would be a bit much to describe the result as ‘the very
definition of tyranny,’ but the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state
cannot be dismissed.”80 And finally he caps his argument by quoting Marbury v. Madison, “It is

76

Id. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

77

Justice Scalia responded to this by saying:
What the dissent needs, and fails to produce, is a single case in which a general conferral of
rulemaking or adjudicative authority has been held insufficient to support Chevron deference for
an exercise of that authority within the agency’s substantive field. There is no such case, and what
the dissent proposes is a massive revision of our Chevron jurisprudence.

Id. at 1873.
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Id. at 1878 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156
(2010)).

79

Id. (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting)). It is, of course, impossible to
disprove such a statement, but, as Professor Mashaw discovered, “From the earliest days of the Republic, Congress
delegated broad authority to administrators, armed them with coercive powers, created some systems of
administrative adjudication, and specifically authorized administrative rulemaking.” Mashaw, supra note 6, at 5.

80

Id. (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010)
and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting)).

13

emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”81 adding
“The rise of the modern administrative state has not changed that duty.

Indeed, the

Administrative Procedure Act, governing judicial review of most agency action, instructs
reviewing courts to decide ‘all relevant questions of law.’”82
This increasing skepticism of deference to agencies’ legal interpretations lay somewhat
dormant for the next two years—until March 9, 2015, when the Supreme Court decided two
cases that, without dissent, but with spirited concurrences, reversed separate decisions of the
D.C. Circuit authored by Judge Janice Rogers Brown, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers83 and Dep’t of
Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads (also known as the Amtrak case).84
I mention Judge Brown’s name for a reason. Appointed to the D.C. Circuit in 2005 after
serving on the California Supreme Court and as a state government official, Judge Brown’s antiNew Deal views were well known. In a 2000 speech to the Federalist Society chapter of the
University of Chicago Law School, she gave a remarkable speech that can only be appreciated
for its radicalism if read in its entirety. But one passage makes her views clear:
Big government is not just the opiate of the masses, it is the opiate. The drug of
choice for multi-national corporations and single moms; for regulated industries
and rugged Midwestern farmers and militant senior citizens. It is my thesis today
that the sheer tenacity of the collectivist impulse—whether you call it socialism or
communism or altruism—has changed not only the meaning of our words, but the
meaning of our Constitution, and the character of our people.85
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Id. at 1880, quoting Marbury, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

82

Id. at 1880, quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706. There are strong echoes of this rhetoric in the Chief Justice’s opinion for the
Court in King v. Burwell case, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), see text infra, at notes 110–12.
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135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
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135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015).
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Janice Rogers Brown, “A Whiter Shade of Pale: Sense and Nonsense—the Pursuit of Perfection in law and
Politics, speech to The Federalist Society, University of Chicago Law School, (Apr 4, 2000), available at
http://communityrights.org/PDFs/4-20-00FedSoc.pdf.
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Judge Brown also displayed these views in an unusual D.C. Circuit opinion in 2012. The
case, Hettinga v. United States,86 was a constitutional challenge to a statute setting up the milk
marketing order program. The challengers argued that the Act, which required them (as large
producer-handlers of milk) to make financial contributions required of all milk handlers, was a
bill of attainder and violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The district court
ruled against them and the D.C. Circuit in a per curiam opinion had little trouble affirming, based
on long-standing precedents rejecting such arguments in the past. However, Judge Brown
(joined by Judge Sentelle) penned a long concurrence to the per curiam opinion where she said
how she really felt:
The Hettingas’ sense of ill-usage is understandable. So is their consternation at
being confronted with the gap between the rhetoric of free markets and the reality
of ubiquitous regulation. The Hettingas’ collision with the [milk marketing
statute]—reveals an ugly truth: America’s cowboy capitalism was long ago
disarmed by a democratic process increasingly dominated by powerful groups
with economic interests antithetical to competitors and consumers. And the
courts, from which the victims of burdensome regulation sought protection, have
been negotiating the terms of surrender since the 1930s.87
Views like this led Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule to label Judge Brown and several of her
colleagues on the D.C. Circuit as practitioners of “libertarian administrative law.”88
Her jurisprudence reached the Supreme Court this March with the review (and
unanimous reversal) of her decisions in the Mortgage Bankers and Amtrak cases.89 But although
the government prevailed in both, several of the Justices seemed to sympathize with her and
continued their running dialogue expressing doubt about Auer deference and even Chevron.
86

677 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

87

Id. at 480 (Brown, J. concurring).

88

Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393 (2015). They refer
to the Hettinger concurrence as “startling” and declare that it “is best understood as a kind of manifesto of libertarian
administrative law.” Id. at 406.

89

Her D.C. Circuit decisions are Mortgage Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F. 3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013) and Ass’n of
American Railroads v. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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In Mortgage Bankers, the Court reviewed the D.C. Circuit’s line of cases known as the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine (sometimes called the Alaska Hunters doctrine) that held that when
an agency had interpreted its own regulation through an interpretative rule once, it could not
change that interpretation again without going through notice-and-comment rulemaking.90 The
Court unanimously held that this doctrine added a requirement not present in the APA and
therefore was inconsistent with Vermont Yankee. But Justices Alito, Scalia and Thomas could
not let this pass without some extensive commentary on the deference doctrines.
For example, this is from Justice Alito’s concurring opinion:
I agree that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is incompatible with the APA. The
creation of that doctrine may have been prompted by an understandable concern
about the aggrandizement of the power of administrative agencies as a result of
the combined effect of (1) the effective delegation to agencies by Congress of
huge swaths of lawmaking authority, (2) the exploitation by agencies of the
uncertain boundary between legislative and interpretive rules, and (3) this Court’s
cases holding that courts must ordinarily defer to an agency’s interpretation of its
own ambiguous regulations. See Seminole Rock. I do not dismiss these concerns,
but the Paralyzed Veteran doctrine is not a viable cure for these problems. At
least one of the three factors noted above, however, concerns a matter that can be
addressed by this Court. The opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas offer
substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be incorrect.91
Justice Thomas’s long concurrence ends this way: “By my best lights, the entire line of
precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises serious constitutional questions and should be
reconsidered in an appropriate case.”92 Not to slight the Chevron doctrine, he made the same
point about it a few months later, suggesting there are “serious questions about the

90

The doctrine was announced in dicta in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586
(D.C. Cir. (1997) (“Once an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it
would formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice and comment rulemaking,”) and applied
in Alaska Professional Hunters Ass’n., Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
91

Mortgage Bankers, 135 U.S. at 1210 (Alito, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

92

Id. at 1225 (Thomas, J. concurring in the judgment).
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constitutionality of our broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal
statutes.”93
Justice Scalia kept up his attack on Auer/Seminole Rock, but he also for the first time
showed second thoughts about Chevron. (Bear in mind that just two years earlier, he was the
principle defender of Chevron against a strong dissent by Chief Justice Roberts in the City of
Arlington case.94) Here is what Justice Scalia said in Mortgage Bankers—quite a different tone:
“Heedless of the original design of the APA, we have developed an elaborate law of deference to
agencies’ interpretations of statutes and regulations. Never mentioning § 706’s directive that the
‘reviewing court . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions,’ we have held that agencies may
authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes” (citing Chevron).95 He continued, “The problem
is bad enough, and perhaps insoluble if Chevron is not to be uprooted, with respect to
interpretive rules setting forth agency interpretation of statutes. But an agency’s interpretation of
its own regulations is another matter.”96 And he then went on to reiterate his criticism of Auer.
Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) expressed an even more portentous reservation
about Chevron’s scope in a concurrence to a denial of certiorari in Whitman v. U.S., involving a
petition to review a conviction for violation of a statute administered by the SEC.97 He first
makes the non-controversial point that “A court owes no deference to the prosecution’s
interpretation of a criminal law.”98 This is related to the rule of lenity in construing criminal
statutes, which “requires interpreters to resolve ambiguity in criminal laws in favor of
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Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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See supra, text at notes 71–75.

95

Id. at 2121 (Scalia, J. (concurring in the judgment).

96

Id. (emphasis supplied).

97

Whitman v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014). (Scalia, J. concurring).

98

Id. (citing Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014)).
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defendants.”99 But then he suggests that “if a law has both criminal and civil applications, the
rule of lenity governs its interpretation in both settings.”100 This would mean that even in civil
enforcement actions, which surely form the bulk of regulatory enforcement actions, Chevron
would not apply if the governing statute also contained criminal penalties.

It would also

logically bar the application of Chevron in a pre-enforcement challenge to a regulation that might
bear on a subsequent criminal prosecution. The Court’s precedent on this point is decidedly
mixed. In a deportation case (nominally civil, but based on a criminal conviction), the Court did
apply the rule of lenity,101 as did a plurality of the Court in a tax case,102 but the Court also
(subsequent to the tax case) applied Chevron in the context of a pre-enforcement challenge to the
Interior Department’s interpretation of the word “take” in the Endangered Species Act.103 In the
latter case, the Court specifically rejected the application of the rule of lenity in this context:
“We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard for reviewing facial
challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute authorizes criminal
enforcement.”104 In his Whitman concurrence, Justice Scalia characterized that case as a “drive
by ruling”105 and, though he felt the Whitman case did not present a good case for revisiting that
holding (partly because the petitioner did not raise the issue), “when a petition properly
presenting the question comes before us, I will be receptive to granting it.”106

99

Id. at 353.

100

Id. at 353–54.

101

Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12, n. 8 (2004).

102

United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518, n. 10 (1992) (plurality opinion).

103

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, (1995).

104

Id. at 704 n.18.

105

Whitman, 135, S. Ct. at 354 (“Babbitt’s drive-by ruling, in short, deserves little weight.”).

106

Id.
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In the Whitman concurrence, Justices Scalia and Thomas do at least have some caselaw
in support of their position. But in his concurrence in the Amtrak case, Justice Thomas took
perhaps the most radical anti-regulatory position of any of his brethren. He not only cited four
different times to Philip Hamburger’s recent book entitled Is Administrative Law Unlawful?,107
he also criticized the Court’s allowance of broad Congressional delegations to the Executive.
This passage is quite remarkable:
Although the Court may never have intended the boundless standard the
“intelligible principle” test has become, it is evident that it does not adequately
reinforce the Constitution’s allocation of legislative power. I would return to the
original understanding of the federal legislative power and require that the
Federal Government create generally applicable rules of private conduct only
through the constitutionally prescribed legislative process. . . . I accept that this
would inhibit the Government from acting with the speed and efficiency Congress
has sometimes found desirable.108
It would also consign administrative rulemaking to the trash heap.
I will conclude with a thought about the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court in the
highly anticipated King v. Burwell case,109 decided after I began this article, involving an IRS
interpretation of a key provision of the Affordable Care Act. He upheld the government’s
reading of the Act, but took the opportunity to further articulate his views on a more limited
scope of Chevron:
When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we often apply the twostep framework announced in Chevron . . . . In extraordinary cases, however,
there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such
an implicit delegation. This is one of those cases. Whether [tax] credits are
107

Amtrak, 135 S. Ct. at 1242, (Thomas, J. concurring in the judgment) (citing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 33–34 (2014), at 1243, (citing Hamburger at 35–36); id. (citing Hamburger at
38); at 1244 (citing Hamburger at 39, n.17). The book was sharply criticized by Professor Vermeule, Adam
Vermeule, “No,” Book Review of “Is Administrative Law Unlawful”? By Philip Hamburger, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1547,
1547 (2015) (“The book makes crippling mistakes about the administrative law of the United States; it
misunderstands what that body of law actually holds and how it actually works. As a result the legal critique,
launched by five-hundred-odd pages of text, falls well wide of the target.”).
108

Id. at 1252 (emphasis supplied).
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135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep “economic and political
significance” that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to
assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. . . . It is
especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS,
which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.
Conservative columnist George Will wrote a strongly critical column the day after this
decision, hyperventilating that “While purporting to not apply Chevron, Roberts expands it to
empower all of the executive branch to ignore or rewrite congressional language that is not at all
ambiguous but is inconvenient for the smooth operation that Congress created.”110 But a week
later, Will had seen a silver lining. He now realized that:
[T]he court denied the power of the IRS—and inferentially, the power of the
executive branch—to be the final word on statutory interpretation. . . . Roberts’s
ruling advanced a crucial conservative objective, that of clawing back power from
the executive branch and independent agencies that increasingly operate
essentially free from congressional control and generally obedient to
presidents.”111
In closing, at least five of the current Justices have expressed, or joined expressions of,
strong opposition to several of the key pillars of the modern administrative state. We will see
where this may end. Will Chevron and Auer survive? Will the non-delegation doctrine be
revived?

Will arbitrary-and-capricious review become a harder look?112

adjudicative power be curtailed?113

Will agency

Will even Vermont Yankee eventually come to be
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One possible new indication of that is Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015), decided on the last day of the
Term. Authored by Justice Scalia, it invalidated an EPA regulation of emissions of hazardous air pollutants from
power plants because EPA failed to consider cost of compliance before deciding whether regulation is appropriate
and necessary, quoting State Farm for the proposition that “agency action is lawful only if it rests ‘on a
consideration of the relevant factors.’” Id. at 2706 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43). The four dissenters argued
that while EPA did not consider costs in determining that some regulation was necessary, as it proceeded in the
rulemaking process, it “later took costs into account again and again.” Id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
113

See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316, (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting),
where Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, in the context of whether a decision by an administrative board
could have issue-preclusive effect on a federal court, opined that “[b]ecause federal administrative agencies are part
of the Executive Branch, it is not clear that they have power to adjudicate claims involving core private rights.”
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questioned? There are some inconsistencies among these opinions, and I may be reading too
much into them, since most of them are not (yet?) majority opinions, but the signals of
opposition are becoming too strong to ignore.
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